Author: Rafał Sakowski
The Grey Zone Between War and Peace – The Role of Disinformation
I have always been told that the world is not black and white, but exists in shades of grey, and that navigating this zone of uncertainty is an art. While working on the bid for the title of European Capital of Culture, I began to look more broadly—and more seriously—at what was happening in Poland. The “grey zone” stopped being merely an economic term in my mind. Conversations and panels during the Freedom Games in Łódź last year, as well as discussions of reports on Russian and Belarusian influence, had a significant impact on me. Once again, I realized that knowing about something and truly understanding it are two different things.
Then came further reading and podcasts, including The Wargame: Into the Grey Zone (Sky News). This leads to a fundamental question: what exactly is the grey zone?
The grey zone of conflict is the space between peace and open war, where states conduct hostile activities below the threshold of conventional confrontation. Lines of responsibility and intent blur, and rivalry becomes permanent: pressure, coercion, provocation—without a formal declaration of war. Russia, in particular, actively uses these methods, treating conflict with the West as a continuous process in which information becomes a tool to weaken the opponent—and, in extreme cases, to prepare the ground for kinetic action.
In this context, it is worth recalling the tradition of so-called “active measures”—a set of techniques developed by the KGB during the Cold War: manipulation, infiltration, discrediting opponents, and controlling narratives. Today, these techniques have gained new fuel: algorithms, social media, and digital infrastructure.
Disinformation as a Weapon in the Grey Zone
One of the key tools of below-threshold warfare is disinformation and information warfare. Experts at the RAND Corporation note that Russian grey zone activities in Europe rely primarily on influence campaigns targeting political and social institutions.
Propaganda and fake news aim to undermine trust in authorities, fuel polarization, and weaken the will to resist. Continuous information bombardment—from conspiracy theories to historical manipulation—is designed to erode societal resilience and create decision-making chaos.
As a former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence observed, such operations are often planned, synchronized, and tested, with the goal of amplifying distrust and division—often before we even recognize them.
Disinformation is so effective because it is inexpensive, scalable, and difficult to attribute unequivocally. Social media amplifies this effect: content spreads not only through specialized networks but also via ordinary users who share it in good faith.
Examples of Grey Zone Activities
In recent years, we have seen numerous examples of what war between war and peace looks like in practice. The annexation of Crimea (2014)—carried out virtually without a shot fired—was preceded by masked military presence (the so-called “little green men”) and a flood of disinformation. This informational noise hindered a swift Western response by undermining clarity about who was doing what on the ground.
In Europe, operations have exploited emotions and tensions around migration. In Germany (2016), the false story of a girl named Lisa allegedly kidnapped by immigrants sparked public outrage and was amplified by Russian disinformation efforts.1
In Poland, the examples are equally troubling. The crisis on the Belarusian border (2021) was artificially engineered by the Lukashenko regime and supported by propaganda discrediting Polish institutions. In 2025, the Polish Armed Forces General Staff warned of a Russian cognitive operation aimed at driving a wedge between Poles and Ukrainians—using hate speech, cyberattacks, arson, and GPS signal disruptions.2
These cases demonstrate that grey zone activities combine multiple domains—information, cyberspace, and physical incidents—to achieve maximum synergistic effect.3
Poland and Europe in the Face of Hybrid Threats
Due to its geographic location and historical experience, Poland finds itself on the front line of grey zone confrontation. Hybrid operations aim to weaken our security and international standing by exploiting internal divisions and radicalizing public sentiment.
Similar threats affect other countries in the region, including the Baltic states, Romania, and Finland. The European Union has strengthened its monitoring and exposure of false narratives (East StratCom Task Force / EUvsDisinfo). NATO has also developed its approach to hybrid threats, emphasizing that below-threshold actions can undermine Alliance security as tangibly as a conventional attack.
International cooperation is crucial—but so are resilient institutions and a resilient society, prepared to withstand informational pressure before it turns into political pressure.
Social Resilience as a Defensive Shield
From the perspective of the Pasmo Foundation – Institute for Social Resilience, the answer to the grey zone lies in building social resilience: the capacity to recognize and counter hostile narratives, maintain community cohesion, and preserve trust in institutions despite ongoing influence campaigns.
This is why we are developing the Narrative Lab—combining lesson design, tools, and educational campaigns with work on language that avoids escalating panic while clearly naming threats. Informational resilience grows when we strengthen media literacy, support quality journalism, develop verification practices, and teach how manipulation works (e.g., deepfakes, troll farms, coordinated networks of accounts).
Another key element is synergy between the state and civil society. The Government Security Centre (RCB) and cybersecurity incident response teams should systematically cooperate with think tanks and NGOs in analyzing trends, developing scenarios, and designing responses.
Finally, we need international partnerships: sharing experience within the EU and NATO, drawing on best practices (such as Finland’s resilience education programs), and jointly developing rapid response mechanisms. The more society understands the logic of disinformation, the less attractive the grey zone becomes as a battlefield.
Conclusion
Conflict in the grey zone has become a permanent feature of contemporary security. Adversaries of the West wage undeclared war on multiple fronts simultaneously—informationally, cybernetically, and through provocations. Experience shows that disinformation operations often precede kinetic strikes: first undermining morale, trust, and readiness for collective action.
We therefore need a coherent strategy—from clearly communicating which grey zone actions are unacceptable, to institutional reforms improving response coordination. Equally important is combining openness with resilience: free media and open debate are foundations of democracy, but they require protection against instrumental exploitation and a commitment to high standards of reliability.
Constant vigilance, cooperation, and investment in social resilience will ensure that Poland is not a soft target. In doing so, we reduce the advantage authoritarian actors currently hold in the grey zone and diminish the effectiveness of their disinformation weapon.
I recomend reading: Poland’s Threat Assessment: Deepened, Not Changed
- Marshall Center: Coordinated, Deliberate, Effective: Why Authoritarians Are Winning the Hybrid War ↩︎
- PAP: Wojsko Polskie ostrzegło przed wojną kognitywną: Kreml podważa zaufanie Polaków do Ukraińców ↩︎
- Royal United Services Institute: Deterring Kremlin Grey Zone Aggression Against NATO ↩︎
